Back in September 2019, Microsoft announced it would start to turn off Basic Authentication for non-SMTP protocols in Exchange Online on tenants where the authentication protocol was detected as inactive. This is part of an overall movement to deprecate the less secure Basic Authentication, which is unfit to face the security challenges of the modern world, being subject to things like password spray attacks. It’s modern successor, modern authentication or OAuth2, uses a token and claim based mechanism contrary to sending accounts and passwords, and is the preferred authentication method. When combined with Azure AD for authentication, Modern Authentication also supports features such as Multi-Factor Authentication or Conditional Access.
The original date for disabling of Basic Authentication was October 13th, 2020. Then the world had other matters to deal with, and Microsoft extended the timelines. After initially postponing turning Basic Authentication off to second half of 2021, the most recent – and final – start date for permanently turning the lights off for Basic Authentication is now set to October 1st, 2022, as per this article on Docs and MC286990 in the Message Center. Mind the ‘start’ in start date, as flicking the switch for millions of tenants takes time before it becomes effective on your tenant. Organizations do need to anticipate on this change for the first of October.
Until October, organizations can still (re-)enable Basic Authentication when they have a need, using the self-help system in the Microsoft 365 admin center. After entering “Diag: Enable Basic Auth in EXO” in the problem search query, the request will be checked, and Basic Authentication will get enabled. But with the end of support for Basic Authentication, so will this temporary workaround. On a side note, per end of 2020, newly created tenants already have basic authentication disabled by means of security defaults – if those organizations require Basic Authentication for some reason, they will also need to reconfigure security defaults which by default is an all or nothing option for all protocols.
So, with the doomsday counter ticking away for Basic Authentication, what are the consequences for Exchange related workloads organizations might wonder. In this article, I will try to address some of these concerns.
The Exchange PG released March updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016 and 2019. More detailed information on patching and how to get current when running an earlier CU of Exchange, can be found at the original blog post here.
The vulnerabilities addressed in these security updates are:
These vulnerabilities are addressed in the following security updates below. The exception is KB5010324 which does not fix CVE-2022-24463 for Exchange 2013. If this is because of the severity classification or the problem being non-existent for Exchange 2013, has not been not disclosed.
Finally, KB5010324 also contains the following additional fix for Exchange 2013:
5012925 RFC certificate timestamp validation in Exchange Server 2013
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU11 to Exchange 2019 CU10. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU10-KBXXXXXX-x64-en.msp.
As a reminder, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt to prevent issues during installation. In other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file. And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a test environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach; the ratings are an indication of the urgency.
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here. The security update also fixes the OWA redirection problem for Exchange hybrid deployments introduced with the November security updates.
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU11 to Exchange 2019 CU10. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU10-KBXXXXXX-x64-en.msp.
As a reminder, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt to prevent issues during installation. In other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file. And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a test environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach; the ratings are an indication of the urgency.
Another month, another Patch Tuesday! A quick blog on November’s security updates for Exchange Server 2013 up to 2019. The vulnerabilities addressed in these security updates are:
Vulnerabilities mentioned in the table above are addressed in the following security updates. Exception is Exchange 2013 CU23 which seemingly only gets fixed for CVE-2021-26427; it is unclear if that is because of Exchange 2013’s lifecycle phase or because the problem does not exist in those builds.
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here. Check the KB articles for any known release notes, such as the possible cross-forest Free/Busy issue and HTTP headers containing version information.
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU11 to Exchange 2019 CU10. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU10-KBXXXXXX-x64-en.msp.
As a reminder, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt to prevent issues during installation. In other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file. And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a test environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach; the ratings are an indication of the urgency.
Vulnerabilities mentioned in the table above are addressed in the following security updates. Exception is Exchange 2013 CU23 which seemingly only gets fixed for CVE-2021-26427; it is unclear if that is because of Exchange 2013’s lifecycle phase or because the problem does not exist in those builds.
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here. Check the KB articles for any known release notes, such as the possible cross-forest Free/Busy issue and HTTP headers containing version information.
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU11 to Exchange 2019 CU10. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU10-KBXXXXXX-x64-en.msp.
As a reminder, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt to prevent issues during installation. In other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file. And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a test environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach; the ratings are an indication of the urgency.
When looking at the MSRC information, you will notice 3 additional CVE issues addressed for July 13th. However, as far as I can see CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-33766 were addressed in the April 2021 and eventually the May 2021 Security Updates, which also would explain MSRC’s mention of earlier CUs, such as Exchange 2019 CU8.
CVE-2021-33768 does not seem applicable to Exchange 2019 CU9 or Exchange 2016 CU20.
CVE-2021-34470 is only addressed in the security update for Exchange 2013 CU23.
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here, which mentions some specific post-deployment instructions:
When running n-1 CU of Exchange 2019 (CU9) or Exchange 2016 (CU20), and you do not plan to upgrade to the latest CU yet but do wish to install this Security Update, you must also update the AD Schema using the CU10 or CU21 installation files.
When you are running Exchange 2013 CU23 in your organization, and no later Exchange builds are present, you need to deploy a schema update immediately after deploying the Security Update. After deploying the SU, from an elevated CMD prompt, run Setup.exe /PrepareSchema /IAcceptExchangeServerLicenseTerms from Exchange’s bin folder. You you need to separate the update from deploying the update, see end of article for a tip.
The blog also mentions some issues, which are identical to the ones mentioned with the May 2021 Security Updates:
Accounts ending in ‘$’ cannot use EMS or access the ECP.
Cross-forest Free/Busy might stop working resulting in 400 Bad Request (solution).
Running cmdlets against EMC using invoked runspace might result in no-language mode error (info).
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU9 to Exchange 2019 CU8. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU9-KBXXXXXX-x64-en.msp.
On another note, after deploying the security updates Exchange will start reporting its version number in the HTTP response header.
As a reminder, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt to prevent issues during installation. In other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file. And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a acceptance environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach. The rating implies a form of urgency.
OWA/ECP and HMAC errors There are reports of the Security Update breaking OWA/ECP. Symptoms are browsers displaying an HMAC error:
Server Error in '/owa' Application.
ASSERT: HMACProvider.GetCertificates:protectionCertificates.Length<1
Description: An unhandled exception occurred during the execution of the current web request. Please review the stack trace for more information about the error and where it originated in the code.
Exception Details: Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.ExAssertException: ASSERT: HMACProvider.GetCertificates:protectionCertificates.Length<1
It is likely related to “Microsoft Exchange Server Auth Certificate”, which can be expired, invalid or for other reasons not being picked up. The reported solution is renewing the “Microsoft Exchange Server Auth Certificate”. This procedure can be found here. Do note that it may take an hour for the certificate to become effective. Meanwhile, you can check the comments in the original Exchange Team post, which is lively with feedback and responses.
Exchange 2013 CU23 SU & Schema Updating Because with Exchange 2013 CU23 schema preparation needs to occur immediately after deploying the SU on (the first) Exchange 2013 CU23 server, a tip might be that you could deploy Exchange 2013 CU23 Management Tools on a workstation, install the SU on that workstation, then run the PrepareSchema from there before deploying the SU on any Exchange 2013 CU23 server.
This might also be helpful in multi-domain organizations, or organizations where AD and Exchange are managed by different teams or require separate changes. Note that performing the schema update this way requires Visual C++ 2012 Runtime, otherwise you will run into a “Exchange Server setup didn’t complete the operation” and the ExchangeSetup.log will contain “Could not load file or assembly ‘Microsoft.Exchange.CabUtility.dll”.
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here, which also mentions some known issues and workarounds which you might encounter after deploying these updates.
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2019 CU9 to Exchange 2019 CU8. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU9-KB5003435-x64-en.msp.
Also, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt, to prevent issues during installation (other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file). And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a acceptance environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach. The rating implies a form of urgency.
Two years ago, I posted a blog on how to implement Transport Rules in Microsoft Exchange to flag messages originating from outside the organization. Goal is to aid end users in identifying messages originating from outside of the organization, by displaying tags in the subject or body part of received messages. This to make them aware – and hopefully more cautious – when it comes to clicking links or opening attachments. Downside of this method is that every inbound message gets a bit cluttered in their subject or body with tags and notifications, which becomes more evident when replying back and forth to external messages. Back then, I already stated a sort of MailTip would be a more preferable and elegant solution.
Onward to 2021, where tagging of external messages became a generally available feature in March for Exchange Online (MC243047, announcement), when used together with Outlook for Web Access (OWA), Outlook for Mac, Outlook Mobile. Outlook for Desktop will also receive support for the feature (supported per version 2105 build 14026.20000, InsiderFast currently). To start adopting this tagging mechanism for new messages, organizations need to deploy an organization level setting using Set-ExternalInOutlook, e.g.
This will enable the tagging of external messages in your tenant, except for domains or e-mail addresses which have been specified through the AllowList. In the example above, messages from contoso.com senders will bypass tagging. The AllowList is limited to 30 entries or 1 kB, whichever comes first. You can reconfigure the AllowList through the hashtable method, e.g.
After configuring Set-ExternalInOutlook, tagging is not immediate and can take a short while to become active. To inspect current settings, run Get-ExternalInOutlook.
How tagged mail is presented depends on the client. For example, Outlook for Web Access displays an ‘External’ label in the message list, as well as a MailTip at the top of the e-mail contents:
Same goes for Outlook Mobile, where the message list as well as the message view will show an indicator:
Outlook for Desktop However, Outlook for Desktop does not present a label in the message list, nor exposes a field to filter those external messages, only displaying a MailTip after opening the message:
So, people almost started asking right away if it was not possible to expose External information in the message list. Well, with a little help of “Oldskool” Outlook and forms customization, this is possible, and here is how:
First, we need information related to the MAPI attribute. As the field is not by default available in Outlook, we need to know some of its properties to define it later on. As mention in some of the documents, or Glen Scales’ article on how to identify messages using Graph or Exchange Web Services, the MAPI property tag is 41F28F13-83F4-4114-A584-EEDB5A6B0BFF and its name is IsExternalSender.
Next, we need to construct a .CFG file where we will define the property we want to expose. I’ve already done this part for you, and you can download IsExternalSender.cfg from GitHub. Also download the two .ico files and put them in the same folder as the .cfg file. Note that those .ico files only represent the form. Alternatively, you can copy the .cfg file to your Personal Forms Library folder and skip installing, but this way the instruction is a bit simpler, allows you to pick the Folder Forms Library and will skip the elevated access dialog as the Personal Forms Library is a protected folder.
Open Outlook, go to File > Options > Advanced and click the Custom Forms button. There, click Manage Forms. By default, the form is installed in your Personal Folder Library. You can also pick a mailbox to store the form, allowing it to roam together with the view changes we will perform later. Click Install and pick the prepared .cfg file you downloaded from GitHub, and the following dialog should be shown:
Click OK to confirm you want to load the information in the form file in your personal forms library and close the Forms Manager. Going back to the Outlook navigation view, you can now add an IsExternalSender field to the message list. Right-click the field header and select Field Chooser. In the drop-down list, select Forms.., and add External Tagging Form to the Selected Forms. Field Chooser should now display an available field named IsExternalSender, which you can add to your current view using drag & drop.
Note that the .cfg defines the IsExternalSender as Boolean and showing it as an Icon. This means that for External messages, the column IsExternalSender will contain a checkbox:
When you want, you can create custom fields to adjust how the information is presented. For example, you can create a custom field using a formula to display [EXTERNAL] for IsExternalSender messages, which might be more usable in certain views instead of the checkbox. To accomplish this, select New in Field Chooser,and create a field named ExternalTag, type Formula and enter the following formula:
iif([IsExternalSender]=-1,"[EXTERNAL]","")
You can then add the ExternalTag field to Compact View. Do note the text takes up a row in Compact view, thus might replace sender or the subject depending on layout and field order.
On a final note, when wanted you can filter, sort or create Search Folders using the new IsExternalSender field.
Exchange On-Premises Organizations running Exchange Hybrid, routing inbound messages through Exchange Online, are not able to benefit from external e-mail tagging. IsSenderExternal is only stamped on messages destined for mailboxes in Exchange Online. These organizations have therefor no way to identify these messages landing in their Exchange on-premises environment, and may require them to deploy the less elegant Transport Rules solution regardless.
15Apr2021: Added note about Pwn2Own vulnerabilities not being addressed by these updates.
A quick blog on April’s security updates for Exchange Server 2013 up to 2019. Details regarding these vulnerabilities are confidential, but organizations are recommended to install these updates based on their rating. With patching procedures still fresh in everyone’s memory, and every Exchange on-premises server being current after the Hafnium issues, that should not be a problem, right?
The fixes address the following Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities:
More detailed information can be found at the original blog post here. Note that the recently discovered at the Pwn2Own 2021 contest are not (yet) addressed by these updates, according to this blog by the contest organizers.
The exploit can be fixed by single security update, which you can find below.
Be advised that these security updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2016 CU20 to Exchange 2016 CU19. Also, the security update download has the same name for different Cumulative Updates, and I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2019-CU9-KB5001779-x64-en.msp.
Also, run the Security Update from an elevated command prompt, to prevent issues during installation (other words: Do not just double-click on the .MSP file). And on a final note, as with any patch or update, I’d recommend to apply this in a acceptance environment first, prior to implementing it in production. However, it is not recommended to wait for regular maintenance cycles when it concerns security updates, and follow a more agile approach. The rating implies a form of urgency.
Another month, another set of security updates for Exchange Server 2016 and 2019, including out-of-band updates for Exchange 2013 CU23 and Exchange 2010 SP3 (Rollup 32). Given the risk of this vulnerability, security updates for older out-of-support CUs (Ex2016 CU8 was released December 2017) were also made available. According to the related Exchange team blog, these exploits are seen being used as part of an attack chain. After publication of this vulnerability named Hafnium, proof of concept kits were published after which variations started to appear (e.g. DearCry). Needless to say, the security update is critical and deployment should not be postponed – intermediate mitigations (with consequences) are also available.
These fixes address the following Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities:
The exploit can be fixed by security update, or in case of Exchange 2010 SP3 by applying a Rollup, which you can find in the table below per current Exchange version. Microsoft published security updates for older CUs as well on March 8th; these have been added to the table below.
You may not be prompted for a reboot, but one is required.
When manually installing the update use an elevated command prompt, don’t just double-click the .msp. To apply an .msp from an elevated prompt, e.g. msiexec.exe /p <Full Path to File>.
When you need to update to a more current Cumulative Update first, update using an elevated command prompt, e.g. setup.exe /m:upgrade /IAcceptExchangeServerLicenseTerms
Per product group feedback, Exchange 2010 is not vulnerable to the same attack chain as Exchange 2013/2016/2019, hence the Rollup mentioning a single CVE.
When running product levels earlier than the ones patched, i.e. Exchange 2016 CU17, you are at risk. There are no patches for earlier product levels, so you need to update to a recent CU after which you can install the security update.
When installing a recent CU first in order to be able to install the security update, reboot after installing the CU, then install the security update. This prevents issues caused by files being locked or updating files pending replacement during reboot.
When you are significantly behind regarding keeping your Exchange servers up to date, the blog Upgrade Paths for CU’s and .NET might help in determining an update strategy.
The statement to stay up to date with at most CU n-1 is not some random adage; apart from features and fixes, it also allows you to quickly respond to these type of emergencies.
Make sure you have configured proper Anti-Virus/Malware exclusions for Exchange server, as documented here for Exchange 2016/2019. I’ve seen significant delays or even hangs during setup of Cumulative Updates because of paths and processes not being excluded. When running Exchange virtually, any I/O inspection running on top of your hypervisor is also considered anti-virus/malware software, such as Trend Micro Deep Inspection on VMWare.
When deploying CU(n) on top of CU(n-1) when an interim update already has been installed, it is recommended to uninstall the IU prior to deploying CU(n). While it might go through, an abort is likely with mention of detecting an IU (INTERIMUPDATEDETECTED) in Exchange Setup log.
Security Updates are Cumulative Update level specific. You cannot apply the update for Exchange 2016 CU18 to Exchange 2016 CU19. Note that the security update file has the same name for different Cumulative Updates; I would suggest tagging the file name with the CU level, e.g. Exchange2016-CU18-KB5000871-x64-en.msp.
The publication of security updates for some older CUs does not remove the necessity to update and patch with current CUs.
There is also official communication to support this update, including steps to remediate issues with updates and steps to perform analysis (many people overlook the recommendation to run the update elevated for some reason). This deck can be found here: March 2021 Exchange Server Security Update – v1.2.65 – EN.pdf (thanks Chris Lehr).
Mitigations I would also recommend the official follow-up post, which not only has been updated since the original post, but also includes mitigations for organizations which cannot deploy the update yet:
A script to configure IIS rewrite rules to block cookies used in the attack (mitigates CVE-2021-26855).
Disabling UM Services (mitigates CVE-2021-26857).
Disabling ECP application pool (mitigates CVE-2021-27065).
Disabling OAB application pool (addresses CVE-2021-26858).
Needless to say, steps like disabling ECP or OAB impacts client functionality.
Finally Since some people are discovering artifacts of HAFNIUM dating before Microsoft’s official communication, people have been wondering how long this has been going on. For those interested, Krebson Security has published an article with a concise timeline of the events related to this attack.
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